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    Instantiation as a relation can be rejected because prope... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Instantiation as a relation can be rejected because properties have gaps that objects fill directly.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Properties are incomplete or 'gappy' entities that require completion.
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    • 2.When an object fills the gap in a property, the property-object connection is constituted without a separate instantiation relation.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Armstrong's truthmaker argument shows that for 'a is F' to be true, there must be a distinct state of affairs whose constituents include both a and F as bound together.
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    • 2.A property with a 'gap' remains an abstract incomplete entity until bound; the binding itself is an additional ontological commitment that cannot be absorbed into the property's structure.
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    • 3.Eliminating instantiation by invoking gaps merely relocates Bradley's regress into the internal structure of the property rather than dissolving it.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'gappiness' metaphor, drawn from Frege's concept/object distinction, already presupposes a categorial asymmetry that functions exactly as a relational tie does.
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    • 2.If filling a gap constitutes a connection without a relation, the constitution relation itself becomes an unexplained primitive no less mysterious than instantiation.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A property with a 'gap' remains an abstract incomplete entity until bound; the b...Armstrong's truthmaker argument shows that for 'a is F' to be true, there must b...Eliminating instantiation by invoking gaps merely relocates Bradley's regress in...If filling a gap constitutes a connection without a relation, the constitution r...
    +3 moreShow less
    Properties are incomplete or 'gappy' entities that require completion.The 'gappiness' metaphor, drawn from Frege's concept/object distinction, already...When an object fills the gap in a property, the property-object connection is co...

    Similar

    When an object fills the gap in a property, the property-object connec...81%A property F has a gap regardless of whether any specific object fills...81%Because the gap is not specific to any particular object, it cannot ex...79%The gap strategy fails to explain why a particular object has a given ...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: properties
    View source passageHide passage
    A typical line for those convinced that the regress is vicious has consisted in proposing that instantiation is not a relation, or at least not a normal one. Some philosophers hold that it is a sui generis linkage that hooks things up without intermediaries. Peter Strawson (1959) calls it a non-relational tie and Bergmann (1960) calls it a nexus. Broad (1933: 85) likened instantiation to glue, which just sticks two sheets of paper together, without needing anything additional; similarly, instant
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit