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    Intrinsic properties are non-relational and mind-independent — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Challenges→The ideal observer theory of moral judgments fails to constitute the intrinsic worth of a person

    Intrinsic properties are non-relational and mind-independent

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    Natural Theology3 linked

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    Feelings of an observer are relational and mind-dependentMichael Martin's ideal observer theory analyzes moral judgments as the feelings ...The ideal observer theory of moral judgments fails to constitute the intrinsic w...Therefore, feelings of an ideal observer cannot constitute the intrinsic worth o...

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    Absolutely intrinsic properties are non-relational by definition83%A property cannot be both mental and non-mental simultaneously.82%When no real property accounts for a relational situation, the mind pr...80%There are no such things as properties79%

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    SEP: moral-arguments-god
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    A naturalist may want to challenge premise (2) by finding some other strategy to explain human dignity. Michael Martin (2002), for example, has tried to suggest that moral judgments can be analyzed as the feelings of approval or disapproval of a perfectly impartial and informed observer. Linville (2009) objects that it is not clear how the feelings of such an observer could constitute the intrinsic worth of a person, since one would think that intrinsic properties would be non-relational and min

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