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    The ideal observer theory of moral judgments fails to con... — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
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    The ideal observer theory of moral judgments fails to constitute the intrinsic worth of a person

    Natural Theology
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kantian dignity grounds intrinsic worth in rational autonomy, a property persons possess independently of any observer's affective states.
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    • 2.If ideal observer approval were constitutive of worth, persons would lack worth prior to being observed, which contradicts the unconditional nature of dignity Kant articulates in the Groundwork.
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    • 3.A property that can be withheld by stipulating the absence of an observer cannot be intrinsic in the metaphysically robust sense required for foundational moral status.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.G.E. Moore's open question argument shows that any naturalistic or response-dependent reduction of moral properties leaves a residual normative question, indicating the reduction is incomplete.
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    • 2.If ideal observer approval fully constituted worth, asking 'but does an approved person genuinely have worth?' would be trivially closed, yet the question remains substantively open.
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    • 3.The persistent openness of this question demonstrates that ideal observer responses track worth at best extensionally, not constitutively, leaving intrinsic worth unexplained.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Michael Martin's ideal observer theory analyzes moral judgments as the feelings of approval or disapproval of a perfectly impartial and informed observer
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    • 2.Intrinsic properties are non-relational and mind-independent
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    • 3.Feelings of an observer are relational and mind-dependent
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    Topics

    Natural TheologyTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A property that can be withheld by stipulating the absence of an observer cannot...Feelings of an observer are relational and mind-dependentG.E. Moore's open question argument shows that any naturalistic or response-depe...If ideal observer approval fully constituted worth, asking 'but does an approved...
    +6 moreShow less
    If ideal observer approval were constitutive of worth, persons would lack worth ...Intrinsic properties are non-relational and mind-independentKantian dignity grounds intrinsic worth in rational autonomy, a property persons...

    Similar

    Therefore, feelings of an ideal observer cannot constitute the intrins...89%On the ideal observer theory, a person is intrinsically valuable becau...89%But a well-functioning ideal observer would judge a person to be intri...87%Therefore, the ideal observer theory presupposes the very intrinsic va...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-arguments-god
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    A naturalist may want to challenge premise (2) by finding some other strategy to explain human dignity. Michael Martin (2002), for example, has tried to suggest that moral judgments can be analyzed as the feelings of approval or disapproval of a perfectly impartial and informed observer. Linville (2009) objects that it is not clear how the feelings of such an observer could constitute the intrinsic worth of a person, since one would think that intrinsic properties would be non-relational and min
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Michael Martin's ideal observer theory analyzes moral judgments as the feelings ...
    The persistent openness of this question demonstrates that ideal observer respon...
    Therefore, feelings of an ideal observer cannot constitute the intrinsic worth o...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit