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    Intuitively, Sally is thinking of Bill and not Bill* desp... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The irreducibility of demonstrative identification to descriptive identification holds even if the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is true

    Intuitively, Sally is thinking of Bill and not Bill* despite being unable to descriptively distinguish them

    Personal IdentityPhilosophy of Language
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    Personal IdentityPhilosophy of Language

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    If Sally cannot descriptively distinguish Bill from Bill* yet demonstratively si...Let Bill and Bill* be distinct objects that differ in at least one quality, maki...Sally is unaware of the quality that distinguishes Bill from Bill*, so Bill and ...The irreducibility of demonstrative identification to descriptive identification...

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    The argument we have presented above presupposes that Sally and Sally* and Bill and Bill* are numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible pairs of objects. Although many find this to be a genuine possibility, thanks in large part to Max Black (1952) and Robert Adams (1979), there is a long tradition that subscribes to the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according to which, for any objects x and y, if, for every quality F, x is F if and only if y is F (i.e., if x and y are qualitativel

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