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    It is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort ex... — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    It is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists.

    Natural Theology
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists, then it is necessary that a supernatural being of that sort exists.
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    • 2.It is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists, then it is necessary that a supernatural being of that sort exists (by modal Axiom S5).
      ?

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    • 2.It is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Modal claims about necessity require truth-makers, and on Humean or deflationary accounts of modality, there are no facts that ground the necessity of any concrete being's existence.
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    • 2.Hume's Dialogues and the 'Anselmian gap' objection (van Inwagen 1994) establish that conceivability of necessary existence does not entail its genuine metaphysical possibility.
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    • 3.Without an independent route to genuine possibility—beyond bare conceptual consistency—P2 of both arguments reduces to the undefended assertion that the conclusion is possible, rendering the argument circular.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.S5's axiom that ◇□P→□P holds only within a single modal system, but the possibility operator in P2 smuggles in a substantive metaphysical claim that requires independent justification.
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    • 2.Asserting that supernatural necessity is even coherently possible presupposes a robust modal realism about supernatural entities, which is precisely what naturalists deny and cannot be assumed without begging the question.
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    Topics

    Natural Theology

    Related

    Asserting that supernatural necessity is even coherently possible presupposes a ...Hume's Dialogues and the 'Anselmian gap' objection (van Inwagen 1994) establish ...If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort ex...If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort ex...
    +4 moreShow less
    It is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exist...Modal claims about necessity require truth-makers, and on Humean or deflationary...S5's axiom that ◇□P→□P holds only within a single modal system, but the possibil...Without an independent route to genuine possibility—beyond bare conceptual consi...

    Similar

    It is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of some ...96%If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of so...95%If it is possible that it is necessary that a supernatural being of so...88%There must exist a being that is absolutely (not merely hypothetically...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted3/3 agreementValid
    SEP: cosmological-argument
    Gale and Pruss (1999), modal cosmological argument
    View source passageHide passage
    Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss (1999) advanced a modal version of the cosmological argument. They reject the strong version of the PSR, according to which “for every proposition \(p\), if \(p\) is true, then there is a proposition, \(q\), that explains \(p\)”. In its place they favor using a weak version of the PSR—it is possible that for every true proposition, there is a proposition, \(q\), that explains \(p\)—that they believe is less question-begging and more initially acceptable to critics. They phrase the argument in terms of contingent and necessary propositions. A contingent proposit...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The argument is explicitly stated in the source passage as the simplest form of Gale and Pruss's modal cosmological argument, and the conclusion follows validly from the two premises by modus ponens.

    Confidence: Clearly stated modal argument with explicit premises and conclusion.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    4 (2 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit