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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that It is not an objection to meaning-engendered (ME) normativity that there are situations in which "green" means green for S without S being obligated to apply "green" only to green objects.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.If semantic obligations are merely prima facie, they presuppose a normative framework prior to meaning that determines when they are overridden.
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    • 2.A normative framework prior to and independent of meaning cannot itself be grounded in meaning, undermining ME normativity's foundational claim.
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    • 3.Therefore, ME normativity cannot explain normativity without presupposing an unexplained normative background, making it explanatorily circular.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's rule-following considerations show that no fact about past usage determines a unique correct application of any term.
      ?

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    • 2.If no fact fixes what 'green' means for S, then no genuine obligation to apply 'green' only to green objects can be derived from meaning alone.
      ?

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    • 3.The prima facie/pro tanto distinction cannot rescue ME normativity if the underlying semantic fact generating the obligation is itself indeterminate.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Semantic obligations are merely prima facie.
      ?

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    • 2.Prima facie obligations may be overridden by other obligations (such as the obligation in a certain context to tell a lie).
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.