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    It is not natural to think of objects as having objects a... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Supports→Objects are wholly present at all temporal points of their existence.

    It is not natural to think of objects as having objects as their temporal parts.

    Consciousness & Mind
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    Consciousness & Mind

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    If objects do not have temporal parts, then objects cannot be thought of as seri...Objects are wholly present at all temporal points of their existence.The only coherent alternative is that an object is wholly present at each moment...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    It is not natural to speak of the temporal parts of objects at all.93%If objects do not have temporal parts, then objects cannot be thought ...88%The temporal phases of an object's existence are not themselves object...86%This contrasts with our ordinary conception of objects, which are not ...78%

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    SEP: substance
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    Various problems can be raised for this account. The most obvious is that it does not, as stated, distinguish between substances and events. Some property-instances belong to events rather than substances. The performance of a symphony, for example, is an event, and it may possess the property, in one of its movements, of being allegro. It seems plausible that this particular case of something’s being allegro could not have been exemplified by another performance, but the performance might go on

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