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    It is not necessarily the case that a material object is ... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Extended material simples are possible.

    It is not necessarily the case that a material object is a simple if and only if the material object occupies a simple (point-sized) region of spacetime.

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    Extended material simples are possible.The Humean premise holds that there are no necessary connections between the acc...There are no necessary connections between the accidental, intrinsic properties ...

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    Therefore, there are no necessary connections between the mereological structure...

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    Extended material simples are possible.78%Therefore, there are no necessary connections between the mereological...74%On Maddy's view, sets of physical objects are located in spacetime whe...74%Giles of Rome distinguishes between material place (the limit of the c...74%

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    (NNC): Let F and G be accidental, intrinsic properties; let R be a fundamental relation; let x and y be contingently existing non-overlapping entities. Then it is not the case that, necessarily, Rxy only if (Fx if and only if Gy)…if we accept the Humean premise that there are no necessary connections between the accidental, intrinsic properties of regions of space and the accidental, intrinsic properties of material objects, then we should hold that there are no necessary connections between the

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