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    There are no necessary connections between the accidental... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Extended material simples are possible.

    There are no necessary connections between the accidental, intrinsic properties of distinct contingently existing non-overlapping entities related by a fundamental relation (the No Necessary Connections principle).

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityCausation

    Key Terms

    Contingent/Contingently existing(describes the type of entities being discussed)
    Something that could exist or could not exist—it's not forced to be the way it is. A coffee cup is contingent because the universe could have existed without it.
    Distinct entities(metaphysics/ontology)
    Separate, independent things that are clearly different from each other.
    Fundamental relation(describes the type of relationship mentioned in the principle)

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    Browse more in Modality & Possibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A basic, primary connection or relationship between things—one that doesn't need to be explained by anything deeper. It's a 'ground level' kind of relationship in reality.
    Non-overlapping entities(clarifies which entities are being discussed)
    Separate things that don't occupy the same space or share the same identity. Two chairs are non-overlapping; a chair and its armrest are overlapping (the armrest is part of the chair).
    accidental properties(Aristotelian substance theory)
    Properties of an object that can be gained and lost over time and which the object might never have possessed at all
    intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
    Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
    necessary connection(Hume's account of the origin of the concept of causation, Treatise I.III.14)
    The felt sense of the mind being pulled from one impression to an associated idea, which the mind then projects onto external objects as if it were a connection among the objects themselves

    Related

    Extended material simples are possible.It is not necessarily the case that a material object is a simple if and only if...The Humean premise holds that there are no necessary connections between the acc...Therefore, there are no necessary connections between the mereological structure...

    Similar

    The Humean premise holds that there are no necessary connections betwe...83%Independent (non-internal) relations cannot serve as the relating rela...80%There cannot be necessary connections between wholly distinct existenc...79%The Second Analogy establishes only the general principle of causality...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: location-mereology
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    (NNC): Let F and G be accidental, intrinsic properties; let R be a fundamental relation; let x and y be contingently existing non-overlapping entities. Then it is not the case that, necessarily, Rxy only if (Fx if and only if Gy)…if we accept the Humean premise that there are no necessary connections between the accidental, intrinsic properties of regions of space and the accidental, intrinsic properties of material objects, then we should hold that there are no necessary connections between the

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