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    It is rational to deplore death more than we deplore our ... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    It is rational to deplore death more than we deplore our not having always existed.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.We have a far-reaching bias toward preferring that good things be in our future and bad things be in our past.
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    • 2.If we take this bias for granted, it is better for us to have goods in the future than in the past.
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    • 3.Death deprives us of good things in the future, whereas not having always existed does not deprive us of future goods.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lucretius argued that prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are metaphysically symmetrical states of deprivation.
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    • 2.If the two states are symmetrical deprivations, then a bias favoring future goods is a mere psychological contingency, not a rational norm.
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    • 3.A mere psychological contingency cannot ground a normative claim about what it is rational to deplore more.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Epicurus held that death is not bad for the one who dies because there is no subject remaining to be harmed by the deprivation.
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    • 2.If the deprivation account of death's badness fails because there is no surviving subject, then death and prenatal non-existence are equally non-harmful, collapsing the asymmetry Parfit's argument requires.
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    Topics

    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    A mere psychological contingency cannot ground a normative claim about what it i...Death deprives us of good things in the future, whereas not having always existe...Epicurus held that death is not bad for the one who dies because there is no sub...If the deprivation account of death's badness fails because there is no survivin...
    +4 moreShow less
    If the two states are symmetrical deprivations, then a bias favoring future good...If we take this bias for granted, it is better for us to have goods in the futur...Lucretius argued that prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are me...We have a far-reaching bias toward preferring that good things be in our future ...

    Similar

    Our condemnation of death is based on the assumption that more life wo...81%It is irrational to object to death (assuming it ends our existence).80%It is not irrational to prefer not to be at the end of our lives, unab...80%The normality and inevitableness of death do not imply that it would n...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: death
    Parfit
    View source passageHide passage
    According to Parfit, we have a far-reaching bias extending to goods in general: we prefer that any good things, not just pleasures, be in our future, and that bad things, if they happen at all, be in our past. He argues that if we take this extensive bias for granted, and assume that, because of it, it is better for us to have goods in the future than in the past, we can explain why it is rational to deplore death more than we do our not having always existed: the former, not the latter, deprives us of good things in the future (he need not say that it is because it is in the past that we worr...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The passage explicitly presents Parfit's argument that by taking the bias for future goods for granted and assuming it makes future goods better for us, we can explain why it is rational to deplore death more than not having always existed, since death (not pre-natal nonexistence) deprives us of future goods—matching the extracted premises and conclusion.

    Confidence: Clearly articulated argument attributed to Parfit.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit