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    Kant's transcendental idealism is not equivalent to Berke... — Carmelics
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    Kant's transcendental idealism is not equivalent to Berkeley's idealism

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Kant denies that spatiality and temporality belong to things as they are in themselves
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    • 2.Kant provides no reason to deny that there are things distinct from our representations of them and our own minds
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    • 3.Berkeley's idealism does deny the existence of things distinct from minds and representations
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's things-in-themselves are never experienced and play no explanatory role distinguishable from simple non-existence, as Jacobi's critique established.
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    • 2.A distinction between idealist systems that turns on positing causally inert, unknowable entities is philosophically vacuous rather than substantive.
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    • 3.Berkeley's God performs the same structural role as Kant's things-in-themselves: grounding the regularity of experience without being directly accessible to finite minds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kant explicitly states that objects of outer intuition exist only as representations in us, which is the defining thesis of Berkeleyan immaterialism.
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    • 2.The Refutation of Idealism in the B-edition was added precisely because contemporaries like Garve and Feder correctly identified Kant's first edition as collapsing into Berkeleyan idealism.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    3 topics

    Perception2 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    A distinction between idealist systems that turns on positing causally inert, un...Berkeley's God performs the same structural role as Kant's things-in-themselves:...Berkeley's idealism does deny the existence of things distinct from minds and re...Kant denies that spatiality and temporality belong to things as they are in them...
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    Kant explicitly states that objects of outer intuition exist only as representat...Kant provides no reason to deny that there are things distinct from our represen...

    Similar

    Kant's transcendental idealism cannot be straightforwardly identified ...89%Kant does not need a separate argument for transcendental idealism in ...88%The Refutation of Idealism does not address the sense of idealism at i...86%Langton's interpretation of transcendental idealism is consistent with...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: idealism
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    In a passage added to the second edition of the Critique, Kant also points out that by arguing for the “transcendental ideality” of spatio-temporality—that it is a necessary feature of our representations of things but not a feature of things as they are in themselves at all—he does not mean to degrade space to a “mere illusion”, as did “the good Berkeley” (B 71): his position is that it is a subjective but necessary feature of our way of representing things, similar to secondary qualities such
    Extraction notes

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    Details

    Kant's things-in-themselves are never experienced and play no explanatory role d...
    The Refutation of Idealism in the B-edition was added precisely because contempo...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit