Kaplan's own framework distinguishes necessity (truth at all worlds) from what is merely 'dthat'-fixed: a rigidified description is not thereby metaphysically necessary (Kaplan, 'Demonstratives', 1989).

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Demonstratives(philosophy of language): Words that point to or identify something based on context, like 'this,' 'that,' 'these,' or 'those.'
Kaplan(the statement refers to his specific argument): David Kaplan is a philosopher who studied how words like 'I,' 'here,' and 'now' work—words whose meaning depends on who's speaking and when they're speaking.
Metaphysically necessary(as used in modal metaphysics): Something that must be true in all possible ways the world could be; it's not just true in our world but couldn't possibly be false in any imaginable scenario.
Necessity (in philosophy)(describing what kind of claim is being made about supernatural things): Something that must be true or must exist; it couldn't possibly be otherwise (as opposed to something that just happens to be true but could have been different).

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