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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The property 'actually being on David's right' is a neces... — Carmelics
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    Home/Personal Identity
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    The property 'actually being on David's right' is a necessary property of Paul, not a contingent one.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For any world w, Paul has the rigidified property of actually being on David's right in w just in case in the actual world Paul has the contingent property of being on David's right.
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    • 2.Rigidifying a contingent property produces a property whose extension is fixed by the actual world and thus holds necessarily.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rigidification fixes reference across worlds but does not transform a contingent relational fact into a necessary intrinsic property of Paul.
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    • 2.A property whose instantiation depends on Paul's actual spatial relation to David is still grounded in a contingent state of affairs, regardless of how it is linguistically indexed.
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    • 3.Necessary properties must be ones a thing could not fail to have; Paul could have existed without David, so no relational property involving David can be necessary to Paul.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kaplan's own framework distinguishes necessity (truth at all worlds) from what is merely 'dthat'-fixed: a rigidified description is not thereby metaphysically necessary (Kaplan, 'Demonstratives', 1989).
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    • 2.If 'actually being on David's right' were a necessary property of Paul, counterpart theory would be unable to evaluate Paul's modal properties without trivializing all actual relational facts as necessary, an unacceptable result (Lewis, 'On the Plurality of Worlds', 1986).
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A property whose instantiation depends on Paul's actual spatial relation to Davi...For any world w, Paul has the rigidified property of actually being on David's r...If 'actually being on David's right' were a necessary property of Paul, counterp...Kaplan's own framework distinguishes necessity (truth at all worlds) from what i...
    +3 moreShow less
    Necessary properties must be ones a thing could not fail to have; Paul could hav...Rigidification fixes reference across worlds but does not transform a contingent...Rigidifying a contingent property produces a property whose extension is fixed b...

    Similar

    The rigidified property 'actually being on David's right' is a necessa...91%The property 'being on David's right' is not an individual essence of ...88%If Paul is the only person to have the contingent property of being on...86%The rigidified property 'actually being on David's right' is an indivi...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: propositions-singular
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    The second response involves moving from contingent properties like those involved in (2) and (3) to necessary properties, and in particular to what, following Plantinga in (1974), we will call an individual essence, which is a property that, necessarily, if x exists, then it has that property and, necessarily, only x has. The property being on David's right is not an individual essence of Paul, as Paul might have existed without having had it and Charles might have had it instead. But it is eas
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit