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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    It is not the case that Keynes demonstrated in his Treatise on Probability that the reference class of 'equipossible' outcomes changes with how the problem is described, yielding contradictory probability values for identical events.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Different descriptions typically represent genuinely different probability problems, not identical events with contradictory answers.
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    • 2.Keynes himself advocated for principled selection of reference classes based on relevant evidence, not abandonment of equipossibility frameworks.
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    • 3.Modern probability theory resolves description-dependence through formal axioms and measure theory, showing apparent contradictions rest on undefined problems.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Keynes showed that 'fair die' descriptions yield different reference classes depending on whether we assume physical symmetry or logical symmetry principles.
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    • 2.The Bertrand paradox demonstrates that identical physical setups yield contradictory probabilities under different parameterizations of the sample space.
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    • 3.If description-dependent reference classes produce different probability values for the same event, classical equipossibility cannot be a foundational principle.
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