Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Keynes's framework permits no learning from experience and thus cannot adequately justify analogical reasoning when negative analogy exists

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Keynes adopted a logical probability measure that permits no learning from experience
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If there is a non-trivial negative analogy, the probability of the conclusion remains unchanged under Keynes's framework
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Keynes treats probability as a purely logical relation between propositions, fixed by their content alone, independent of empirical updating.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Carnap's later inductive logic explicitly showed that purely logical probability systems require a continuum of lambda values to handle negative analogy, which Keynes's single framework cannot accommodate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A probability measure that cannot shift its assignments in response to accumulated negative instances fails the basic Bayesian coherence condition that posteriors must differ from priors given relevant evidence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mill's methods of induction require that negative instances actively disconfirm analogical hypotheses, a dynamic process Keynes's static logical relations structurally prohibit.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.When negative analogy exists, Keynes's framework assigns the same probability to the analogical conclusion as before those disanalogous instances were identified, rendering the negative analogy epistemically inert.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.