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    Kit Fine and David Lewis both treat modal truths as law-l... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law) in nature.

    Kit Fine and David Lewis both treat modal truths as law-like regularities capable of grounding explanatory entailment.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Both Fine and Lewis reject Platonism about abstract possible worlds, grounding modality in concrete structures or facts.
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    • 2.Law-like regularities provide determinate truthmakers for modal claims, avoiding vacuous or brute modal facts.
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    • 3.Treating modality as grounded in regularities explains why modal truths support counterfactual reasoning and scientific explanation.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Fine's truthmaker semantics and Lewis's modal realism actually diverge fundamentally on what grounds modal facts.
      ?

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    • 2.Reducing modality to regularities struggles to explain necessary truths that hold across all possible worlds trivially.
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    • 3.Law-like regularities themselves require modal explanation (why these laws, not others?), creating regress rather than grounding.
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    Connections

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    Causation1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Both Fine and Lewis reject Platonism about abstract possible worlds, grounding m...Fine's truthmaker semantics and Lewis's modal realism actually diverge fundament...Law-like regularities provide determinate truthmakers for modal claims, avoiding...Law-like regularities themselves require modal explanation (why these laws, not ...
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    Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law)...Reducing modality to regularities struggles to explain necessary truths that hol...Treating modality as grounded in regularities explains why modal truths support ...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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