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    Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nom... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law) in nature.

    Causation
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Deductive-nomological explanation requires that similar mechanisms give rise to similar phenomena.
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    • 2.Some metaphysical explanations are one-off phenomena, where a similar mechanism need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon.
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    • 3.Deductive-nomological models cannot accommodate one-off explanations.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Metaphysical laws (e.g., that identity is necessary) are universal and support counterfactuals just as natural laws do.
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    • 2.If metaphysical laws sustain deductive inference across all possible worlds, D-N explanation extends naturally to metaphysical domains.
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    • 3.Kit Fine and David Lewis both treat modal truths as law-like regularities capable of grounding explanatory entailment.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'one-off' premise conflates token uniqueness with type-level inexplicability, since D-N models explain token events via type-level laws.
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    • 2.Hempel himself acknowledged that singular causal explanations are D-N explanations with suppressed universal premises, not exceptions to the model.
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    Modality & PossibilityCausation

    Related

    Deductive-nomological explanation requires that similar mechanisms give rise to ...Deductive-nomological models cannot accommodate one-off explanations.Hempel himself acknowledged that singular causal explanations are D-N explanatio...If metaphysical laws sustain deductive inference across all possible worlds, D-N...
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    Kit Fine and David Lewis both treat modal truths as law-like regularities capabl...Metaphysical laws (e.g., that identity is necessary) are universal and support c...Some metaphysical explanations are one-off phenomena, where a similar mechanism ...The 'one-off' premise conflates token uniqueness with type-level inexplicability...

    Similar

    Deductive-nomological explanation requires covering laws that subsume ...85%Deductive-nomological metaphysical explanation cannot account for rare...78%Deductive-nomological models cannot accommodate one-off explanations.76%Deductive-nomological explanation requires that similar mechanisms giv...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: metaphysical-explanation
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    Finally, if metaphysical explanation is deductive-nomological (or “covering law”), it seems that there is no room for explanations of rare or one-off phenomena in terms of the mechanisms that ground (or cause) them, even in cases where, had a similar mechanism occurred, it need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon (e.g., Taylor 2016). According to Trogdon (2018; see also Anscombe 1971), it seems likely that some explanations are one-off in this sense, from which it would seem to follow th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit