Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Knowing that P is false is not equivalent to knowing the ... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→This revision is equivalent to (D1).

    Knowing that P is false is not equivalent to knowing the negation of P if propositional attitudes are hyperintensional.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Hyperintensional contexts distinguish between logically equivalent propositions, so ¬P and 'P is false' may differ in cognitive content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Knowing requires understanding; grasping that P is false involves a different cognitive act than constructing its formal negation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Empirically, subjects report different confidence levels about 'P is false' versus '¬P', suggesting non-equivalent epistemic states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.That P is false and ¬P are logically identical; any knowledge state satisfying one must satisfy the other by substitutivity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Psychological differences in how we express knowledge don't establish genuine differences in what is known—only in performance or framing.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Hyperintensionality applies to belief contents, not to the truth conditions of what is known; knowledge tracks fixed propositional facts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Divine Attributes1 linked

    Related

    Empirically, subjects report different confidence levels about 'P is false' vers...Hyperintensional contexts distinguish between logically equivalent propositions,...Hyperintensionality applies to belief contents, not to the truth conditions of w...Knowing requires understanding; grasping that P is false involves a different co...
    +3 moreShow less
    Psychological differences in how we express knowledge don't establish genuine di...That P is false and ¬P are logically identical; any knowledge state satisfying o...This revision is equivalent to (D1).

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit