Skip to content
Carmelics
Topics
Thinkers
Changes
Contributors
Loading account…
Statements
321,452
Perspectives
108,905
Topics
42
Home
/
Original
/
inverse
See Original
Inverse View
It is not the case that Knowing that P is false is not equivalent to knowing the negation of P if propositional attitudes are hyperintensional.
?
Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.
Reasons For
1 perspective
Reason for
?
1.
That P is false and ¬P are logically identical; any knowledge state satisfying one must satisfy the other by substitutivity.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Psychological differences in how we express knowledge don't establish genuine differences in what is known—only in performance or framing.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Hyperintensionality applies to belief contents, not to the truth conditions of what is known; knowledge tracks fixed propositional facts.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Reasons Against
1 perspective
Reason against
?
1.
Hyperintensional contexts distinguish between logically equivalent propositions, so ¬P and 'P is false' may differ in cognitive content.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Knowing requires understanding; grasping that P is false involves a different cognitive act than constructing its formal negation.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Empirically, subjects report different confidence levels about 'P is false' versus '¬P', suggesting non-equivalent epistemic states.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Next step
Based on where you are in your exploration
Strongest counterpoint
Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.