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    Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium framework encod... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Identifying the solution to Selten's Horse on general principles requires reasoning about players' beliefs about conditional probabilities, not merely strategic beliefs about actions.

    Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium framework encodes conditional probability beliefs as 'systems of beliefs' that are formally part of the equilibrium concept itself, not external to strategic reasoning.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Nash equilibrium fails at information sets unreached in equilibrium play, leaving beliefs undefined—sequential equilibrium solves this by specifying them.
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    • 2.Strategic rationality requires agents to form conditional beliefs about unrealized contingencies; treating beliefs as external ignores this necessity.
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    • 3.Systems of beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path and allow consistent off-path specifications, enabling meaningful refinement of equilibria.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The claim conflates 'formally specified within the equilibrium definition' with 'strategically efficacious'—specification doesn't guarantee beliefs drive rational choice.
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    • 2.Sequential equilibrium still leaves off-path beliefs underconstrained; Bayes' rule applies only where feasible, so beliefs retain significant arbitrariness externally.
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    • 3.Players often condition on narratives or causal models that transcend the game form itself; formalizing beliefs *within* equilibrium may obscure external reasoning.
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    Key Terms

    Equilibrium concept(in game theory)
    A mathematical framework that describes a stable state in a strategic situation where no player wants to unilaterally change their strategy because they're already doing as well as they can.
    Kreps and Wilson(in game theory and economics)
    Two game theorists (David Kreps and Robert Wilson) who developed important tools for analyzing strategic situations where players make decisions one after another and don't have complete information about what others are thinking.
    Strategic reasoning(in game theory and economics)
    The process of thinking through how your choices will interact with and affect other people's choices in a situation where everyone's trying to do well.
    Systems of beliefs(in game theory)
    A formal way of representing what a player thinks about the game situation and what they think other players are thinking; essentially their mental model of the game.
    conditional probability(The theist characterization of what quantum cosmologies actually provide)
    A probability for the existence of some universe configurations given other universe configurations
    sequential equilibrium(Game theory, extensive-form games)
    A solution concept consisting of a strategy profile and a system of beliefs consistent with Bayes's rule, such that every player plays optimally from every information set given those beliefs and the strategy profile

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Identifying the solution to Selten's Horse on general principles requires reason...Nash equilibrium fails at information sets unreached in equilibrium play, leavin...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Players often condition on narratives or causal models that transcend the game f...
    Sequential equilibrium still leaves off-path beliefs underconstrained; Bayes' ru...
    +3 moreShow less
    Strategic rationality requires agents to form conditional beliefs about unrealiz...Systems of beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path and allow consist...The claim conflates 'formally specified within the equilibrium definition' with ...