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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium framework encodes conditional probability beliefs as 'systems of beliefs' that are formally part of the equilibrium concept itself, not external to strategic reasoning.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The claim conflates 'formally specified within the equilibrium definition' with 'strategically efficacious'—specification doesn't guarantee beliefs drive rational choice.
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    • 2.Sequential equilibrium still leaves off-path beliefs underconstrained; Bayes' rule applies only where feasible, so beliefs retain significant arbitrariness externally.
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    • 3.Players often condition on narratives or causal models that transcend the game form itself; formalizing beliefs *within* equilibrium may obscure external reasoning.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Nash equilibrium fails at information sets unreached in equilibrium play, leaving beliefs undefined—sequential equilibrium solves this by specifying them.
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    • 2.Strategic rationality requires agents to form conditional beliefs about unrealized contingencies; treating beliefs as external ignores this necessity.
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    • 3.Systems of beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path and allow consistent off-path specifications, enabling meaningful refinement of equilibria.
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