Kripke argued that psychophysical identity statements, unlike 'water is H2O', cannot be necessary a posteriori because phenomenal properties are essentially what they appear to be.

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Essentially what they appear to be(as Kripke's claim about phenomenal properties): The idea that conscious experiences cannot be something different from how they actually feel to you—if it feels like pain, then it is pain by its very nature.
Kripke: Kripke refers to Saul Kripke, an influential American philosopher and logician known for revolutionizing how we think about names, meaning, and possibility. He argued that names like "Albert Einstein" refer directly to the actual person rather than through descriptions of their properties, which changed philosophy fundamentally. His work also introduced "possible worlds" as a way to understand concepts like necessity and possibility, making him one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.
Psychophysical identity statements(as the type of claim Kripke is discussing): Claims that mental experiences (like what it feels like to see red) are identical to or the same thing as physical brain processes.
a posteriori(Used to classify the epistemic status of necessary statements post-Kripke)

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