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    Type-type identity theory offers a solution to the explan... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Type-type identity theory offers a solution to the explanatory gap problem with respect to qualia.

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    • 1.The explanatory gap problem asks how neural properties cause or give rise to conscious qualitative properties.
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    • 2.Treating the psycho-physical link as an identity eliminates the need to explain how neural properties cause conscious qualitative properties.
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    • 3.If qualia are identical to neural properties, the explanatory gap does not exist.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Identity claims require that co-referring terms share all explanatory properties, but 'pain' and 'C-fiber firing' differ in their epistemic accessibility and explanatory roles.
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    • 2.Levine's explanatory gap shows that even if identity holds metaphysically, the conceptual disconnect between phenomenal and physical descriptions remains unexplained.
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    • 3.A theory that stipulates identity without closing the conceptual gap merely relocates the problem rather than dissolving it.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke argued that psychophysical identity statements, unlike 'water is H2O', cannot be necessary a posteriori because phenomenal properties are essentially what they appear to be.
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    • 2.If 'pain is C-fiber firing' is contingent, the identity theory fails to eliminate the gap; if necessary, it requires an explanation of why the identity is not knowable a priori that type identity theory cannot supply.
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    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A theory that stipulates identity without closing the conceptual gap merely relo...Identity claims require that co-referring terms share all explanatory properties...If 'pain is C-fiber firing' is contingent, the identity theory fails to eliminat...If qualia are identical to neural properties, the explanatory gap does not exist...
    +4 moreShow less
    Kripke argued that psychophysical identity statements, unlike 'water is H2O', ca...Levine's explanatory gap shows that even if identity holds metaphysically, the c...The explanatory gap problem asks how neural properties cause or give rise to con...Treating the psycho-physical link as an identity eliminates the need to explain ...

    Similar

    Appealing to type-type identity does not suffice to dissolve the expla...80%Type-type identity theory is false (or at least not widely tenable)77%The explanatory gap can be grounded in absent qualia scenarios rather ...76%The explanatory gap problem is dissolved if the conscious qualitative ...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: consciousness
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    Nonetheless the type-type identity theory has enjoyed a recent if modest resurgence at least with respect to qualia or qualitative conscious properties. This has been in part because treating the relevant psycho-physical link as an identity is thought by some to offer a way of dissolving the explanatory gap problem (Hill and McLaughlin 1998, Papineau 1995, 2003). They argue that if the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are identical, then there is no need to explain how the
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

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    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
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