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Inverse View
It is not the case that Kripke's original necessity-of-identity arguments apply to constitutive essences, not to relational, law-dependent dispositional properties.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Kripke explicitly argues necessity applies to origin and fundamental properties, which include relational causal-historical facts about objects.
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2.
The distinction between constitutive and dispositional is unclear: physical properties often ground both intrinsic identity and dispositions jointly.
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3.
Even if Kripke's arguments target intrinsics, this doesn't show relational properties aren't necessary—they may be necessarily grounded in essences.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Kripke's arguments focus on rigid designation and metaphysical necessity grounded in intrinsic identity conditions, not external relational facts.
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2.
Dispositional properties depend on counterfactual conditionals and background laws, making them epistemically and metaphysically contingent.
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3.
Constitutive essences (like atomic number for gold) survive across possible worlds; dispositional properties vary with different physical laws.
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