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    Kripke's rule-following considerations show precisely tha... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they must show that semantics needs a normative construal, not merely that it could be given one.

    Kripke's rule-following considerations show precisely that no purely descriptive fact fixes the unique correct projection of a rule, making normative supplementation a theoretical necessity, not a luxury.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Past behavior and dispositional facts underdetermine future application: infinite interpretations fit any finite history.
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    • 2.Normative facts (what we ought to do) are categorically distinct from descriptive facts (what we do or are disposed to do).
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    • 3.Without normative supplementation, rule-following collapses into mere pattern-matching with no genuine normativity or correctness.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Normative facts themselves require determination; invoking norms doesn't solve the regress but merely relocates the problem.
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    • 2.Descriptive facts about social practices, communal training, and shared dispositions may sufficiently constitute rule-following norms.
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    • 3.The conclusion conflates epistemological underdetermination with metaphysical indeterminacy; facts need not be fully specifiable to exist.
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    Key Terms

    Descriptive fact(as opposed to normative claims)
    A statement that simply describes how things actually are in the world, without saying anything about how they should be or what the rules are.
    Fixes(as in 'determines the correct answer')
    In philosophy, this means 'determines' or 'establishes'—to pin down something so that it has one specific meaning or outcome rather than being open to interpretation.
    Kripke
    Kripke refers to Saul Kripke, an influential American philosopher and logician known for revolutionizing how we think about names, meaning, and possibility. He argued that names like "Albert Einstein" refer directly to the actual person rather than through descriptions of their properties, which changed philosophy fundamentally. His work also introduced "possible worlds" as a way to understand concepts like necessity and possibility, making him one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.
    Normative supplementation(as a necessary theoretical element)
    The idea that we need to add something beyond just facts about the world—we need principles or standards about what 'ought' to happen or what counts as correct—to fully explain rule-following.
    Projection of a rule(as the problem of continuing a rule correctly)
    How you extend or apply a rule to new cases you haven't seen before. For example, if you learn the rule 'add 2,' projection means knowing to add 2 to 100, even though you weren't specifically taught that.
    Theoretical necessity(as contrasted with being a 'luxury')
    Something that any good explanation or theory must include in order to make sense; not optional or extra, but required to solve the problem.
    normative(in ethics and philosophy)
    Relating to how things should be or what people ought to do, rather than just describing how things actually are.
    rule-following considerations(in philosophy of language)
    Wittgenstein's famous puzzle about how we know what rule to follow next: if you learn a rule by seeing examples, how do you know you're applying it correctly to new cases you've never seen before?

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Descriptive facts about social practices, communal training, and shared disposit...Normative facts (what we ought to do) are categorically distinct from descriptiv...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Normative facts themselves require determination; invoking norms doesn't solve t...
    Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they mu...
    +3 moreShow less
    Past behavior and dispositional facts underdetermine future application: infinit...The conclusion conflates epistemological underdetermination with metaphysical in...Without normative supplementation, rule-following collapses into mere pattern-ma...