Kripke treats 'pain' as a rigid designator picking out a purely phenomenal property, but this presupposes a Cartesian conception of mental properties that is independently contested.
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Mental properties(types of properties that can't be fully reduced to physics)
Qualities or characteristics of thoughts, feelings, and conscious experiences—like what it feels like to see red or feel happy.
Purely phenomenal property(describing what kind of thing pain is)
A characteristic of something that exists only in the way it feels or appears to your conscious experience—like how redness looks or how pain feels—rather than in any physical or measurable way.
rigid designator(Term due to Kripke (1972); used to distinguish expressions whose reference is fixed across circumstances from those whose reference varies.)
An expression which, relative to a context of utterance, refers to the same object with respect to every circumstance of evaluation at which that object exists, and never refers to anything else with respect to another circumstance of evaluation.