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    Le Poidevin's defense of premise (1) is incomplete — Carmelics
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    Le Poidevin's defense of premise (1) is incomplete

    Natural TheologyTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Le Poidevin's argument relies on a Kolmogorov-style probability framework where simpler hypotheses receive higher priors, but this conflates logical and epistemic probability.
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    • 2.Swinburne's own treatment in 'The Existence of God' distinguishes intrinsic probability from simplicity in ways Le Poidevin's premise (1) fails to accommodate.
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    • 3.Without a complete theory of intrinsic probability that accounts for both simplicity and scope, Le Poidevin's premise (1) remains an undefended assumption, not an argument.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Carnap's inductive logic demonstrates that probability assignments depend on the choice of language and predicate system, not solely on the specificity of a hypothesis.
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    • 2.If intrinsic probability were determined solely by specificity, then the probability of theism versus naturalism would be underdetermined by Le Poidevin's framework, since both can be formulated at varying levels of specificity.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Le Poidevin never shows that intrinsic probability depends only on specificity
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    • 2.There are good reasons to believe that intrinsic probability does not depend only on specificity
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    Natural TheologyTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Carnap's inductive logic demonstrates that probability assignments depend on the...If intrinsic probability were determined solely by specificity, then the probabi...Le Poidevin never shows that intrinsic probability depends only on specificityLe Poidevin's argument relies on a Kolmogorov-style probability framework where ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Swinburne's own treatment in 'The Existence of God' distinguishes intrinsic prob...There are good reasons to believe that intrinsic probability does not depend onl...Without a complete theory of intrinsic probability that accounts for both simpli...

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: atheism-agnosticism
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    Le Poidevin defends the first premise of this argument by stating that, while intrinsic probability plausibly depends inversely on the specificity of a claim (the less specific the claim, the more ways there are for it to be true and so the more probable it is that it is true), it is impossible to show that versatile theism is more specific or less specific than its denial. This defense appears to be incomplete, for Le Poidevin never shows that the intrinsic probability of a proposition depends
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit