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    Leibniz was mistaken to suppose that conceptual common gr... — Carmelics
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    Leibniz was mistaken to suppose that conceptual common ground shared by everyone already exists and could be captured in a universal language.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's later work demonstrates that meaning arises from rule-governed social practices ('forms of life'), not pre-linguistic conceptual universals.
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    • 2.If meaning is constituted by heterogeneous language games, no single formal system can capture concepts that vary across communities and practices.
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    • 3.Leibniz's universal language project presupposes fixed conceptual atoms, a foundationalist assumption dismantled by the open-texture of ordinary language (Waismann).
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation shows that there is no fact of the matter about synonymy across languages, undermining any shared conceptual bedrock.
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    • 2.Without determinate cross-linguistic conceptual identity, the Leibnizian project of encoding universal concepts into a formal notation lacks the stable referential base it requires.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Conceptual common ground is not a pre-existing universal feature of human thought.
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    • 2.Schleiermacher's own earlier proposal of common innate concepts is similarly untenable.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Conceptual common ground is not a pre-existing universal feature of human though...If meaning is constituted by heterogeneous language games, no single formal syst...Leibniz's universal language project presupposes fixed conceptual atoms, a found...Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation shows that there is no fact o...
    +3 moreShow less
    Schleiermacher's own earlier proposal of common innate concepts is similarly unt...Without determinate cross-linguistic conceptual identity, the Leibnizian project...Wittgenstein's later work demonstrates that meaning arises from rule-governed so...

    Similar

    Conceptual common ground is not a pre-existing universal feature of hu...83%Schleiermacher's normal position further holds that there is no concep...82%Schleiermacher's normal position holds that there is no conceptual com...82%Developing a complete history of linguistic and conceptual differences...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: schleiermacher
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    In his 1833 book-fragment Schleiermacher at some points seems close to giving up on this problem, saying in one place that because of it dialectics must restrict itself to a specific “linguistic sphere”. But at other points he evidently still clings to the hope of finding common ground that unites different “linguistic spheres”. What sort of solution does he have in mind? The answer can perhaps be seen from an 1831 address that he delivered on Leibniz’s idea of a universal language. In this addr
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit