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It is not the case that Levine's explanatory gap argument shows that even complete physical knowledge leaves unexplained why neural states feel like anything at all.
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Reasons For
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1.
The conceivability of zombies reflects our current ignorance of psychophysical laws, not evidence that such gaps are metaphysically real.
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2.
Once neuroscience explains the mechanisms producing consciousness, the explanatory gap dissolves—like historical gaps in chemistry and biology.
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3.
Phenomenal properties may be identical to physical properties despite seeming distinct, making the gap epistemic rather than metaphysical.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Physical descriptions explain structural and functional properties, but phenomenal properties (redness, painfulness) seem categorically different.
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2.
We can coherently imagine complete physical knowledge existing without knowing what experiences feel like, suggesting an explanatory gap exists.
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3.
Third-person physical facts cannot logically entail first-person subjective facts about what it is like to experience something.
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