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    Levine's explanatory gap argument shows that even complet... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed to failure.

    Levine's explanatory gap argument shows that even complete physical knowledge leaves unexplained why neural states feel like anything at all.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Physical descriptions explain structural and functional properties, but phenomenal properties (redness, painfulness) seem categorically different.
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    • 2.We can coherently imagine complete physical knowledge existing without knowing what experiences feel like, suggesting an explanatory gap exists.
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    • 3.Third-person physical facts cannot logically entail first-person subjective facts about what it is like to experience something.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.The conceivability of zombies reflects our current ignorance of psychophysical laws, not evidence that such gaps are metaphysically real.
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    • 2.Once neuroscience explains the mechanisms producing consciousness, the explanatory gap dissolves—like historical gaps in chemistry and biology.
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    • 3.Phenomenal properties may be identical to physical properties despite seeming distinct, making the gap epistemic rather than metaphysical.
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    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Connections

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Once neuroscience explains the mechanisms producing consciousness, the explanato...Phenomenal properties may be identical to physical properties despite seeming di...Physical descriptions explain structural and functional properties, but phenomen...The conceivability of zombies reflects our current ignorance of psychophysical l...
    +3 moreShow less
    The project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed t...Third-person physical facts cannot logically entail first-person subjective fact...We can coherently imagine complete physical knowledge existing without knowing w...

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    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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