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    Lewis provides vanishingly little defence of why that par... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Lewis's ontological commitment to possible worlds via the argument from Counterfactuals is insufficiently justified

    Lewis provides vanishingly little defence of why that paraphrase is permissible

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    An ontological commitment requires justification that the paraphrase permitting ...Lewis claims that quantifying over possible worlds in a paraphrase of our theori...Lewis's ontological commitment to possible worlds via the argument from Counterf...

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    The 'argument by paraphrase' from Counterfactuals is insufficient to e...79%The argument relies on treating a folksy paraphrase as metaphysically ...77%Merely being quantified over in some permissible paraphrase is a weake...76%Acceptance of [P1] is justified only if [P1] satisfies the very requir...75%

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    SEP: david-lewis
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    The short argument from Counterfactuals that I quoted seems deeply unQuinean. Rather than saying that possible worlds exist because they are quantified over in the best paraphrase of our theories, Lewis says they exist because they are quantified over in just one paraphrase of our theories. To be sure, he says this is a permissible paraphrase. On the other hand, there is vanishingly little defence of its permissibility.

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