Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Lewis's concretist modal realism can accommodate the robu... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Lewis's concretist modal realism can accommodate the robust truth of accidental properties without contradiction.

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The counterpart relation allows objects to have different properties across possible worlds via numerically distinct but resembling counterparts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.De re modal truths are grounded in facts about counterparts, not in a single object instantiating incompatible properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.This analysis yields entirely unproblematic concretist truth conditions for de re modal sentences.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The counterpart relation is not unique: an object can have multiple counterparts in a world, making de re modal claims indeterminate rather than robustly true.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If 'Humphrey could have won' is true only because some counterpart won, the truth condition concerns a distinct individual, not Humphrey himself—violating the de re requirement.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Kripke's objection stands: Humphrey cares about his own fate, not the fate of a merely resembling individual in another concrete universe.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lewis's analysis replaces modal primitives with a primitive of 'being a world,' which is no less ontologically loaded than irreducible modal operators.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the cost of eliminating modality is positing infinitely many causally isolated concrete universes, Occam's razor favors modal primitivism as the more parsimonious account of accidental properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Modality & Possibility

    Related

    De re modal truths are grounded in facts about counterparts, not in a single obj...If 'Humphrey could have won' is true only because some counterpart won, the trut...If the cost of eliminating modality is positing infinitely many causally isolate...Kripke's objection stands: Humphrey cares about his own fate, not the fate of a ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Lewis's analysis replaces modal primitives with a primitive of 'being a world,' ...The counterpart relation allows objects to have different properties across poss...The counterpart relation is not unique: an object can have multiple counterparts...This analysis yields entirely unproblematic concretist truth conditions for de r...

    Similar

    This analysis yields entirely unproblematic concretist truth condition...81%Modal realism does not make inductive challenges any worse than they w...79%According to modal realism, the way things are in the broadest possibl...79%The strict actualist need not accept the possibilist demand for Tarski...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: possible-worlds
    View source passageHide passage
    In fact, Lewis whole-heartedly accepts that things have accidental properties and, indeed, would accept that (16) is robustly true. His explanation involves one of the most interesting and provocative elements of his theory: the doctrine of counterparts. Roughly, an object y in a world w2 is a counterpart of an object x in w1 if y resembles x and nothing else in w2 resembles x more than y.[19] Each object is thus its own (not necessarily unique) counterpart in the world it inhabits
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit