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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Lewis's concretist modal realism can accommodate the robust truth of accidental properties without contradiction.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The counterpart relation is not unique: an object can have multiple counterparts in a world, making de re modal claims indeterminate rather than robustly true.
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    • 2.If 'Humphrey could have won' is true only because some counterpart won, the truth condition concerns a distinct individual, not Humphrey himself—violating the de re requirement.
      ?

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    • 3.Kripke's objection stands: Humphrey cares about his own fate, not the fate of a merely resembling individual in another concrete universe.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lewis's analysis replaces modal primitives with a primitive of 'being a world,' which is no less ontologically loaded than irreducible modal operators.
      ?

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    • 2.If the cost of eliminating modality is positing infinitely many causally isolated concrete universes, Occam's razor favors modal primitivism as the more parsimonious account of accidental properties.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The counterpart relation allows objects to have different properties across possible worlds via numerically distinct but resembling counterparts.
      ?

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    • 2.De re modal truths are grounded in facts about counterparts, not in a single object instantiating incompatible properties.
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    • 3.This analysis yields entirely unproblematic concretist truth conditions for de re modal sentences.
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