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    Love is both contingent and compelling — Carmelics
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    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    Supports→The contingency of moral commitments does not undermine their normative force

    Love is both contingent and compelling

    Virtue Ethics
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    By analogy, moral commitments can be contingent yet retain compelling normative ...

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    The case for Humean constructivism rests on the alleged inadequacy of competing views: “it is what we are forced to by the untenability of realism plus the failure of Kantian versions of metaethical constructivism” (Street 2010: 371). Humean constructivism denies that normative truths are independent of the deliverances of practical reasoning (Bagnoli 2002: 131; Street 2008a, 2010, 2012; Velleman 2009; Lenman 2010, 2012). To this extent, Humean constructivism builds on the Kantian insight that n

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