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    The contingency of moral commitments does not undermine t... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The contingency of moral commitments does not undermine their normative force

    Moral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Love is both contingent and compelling
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    • 2.By analogy, moral commitments can be contingent yet retain compelling normative force
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Normative force requires that a commitment's authority be grounded in something beyond the contingent perspective of the agent who holds it.
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    • 2.A commitment arising from contingent causes (culture, upbringing, biology) provides no rational basis for binding others who lack that same contingent history.
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    • 3.Moral obligations, unlike love, make universalizable demands on all rational agents, so the analogy to love's contingency is structurally disanalogous.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Mackie's error theory establishes that if moral facts do not exist mind-independently, moral language systematically makes false objective claims.
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    • 2.Constructivism's concession that moral commitments are contingent implicitly surrenders the mind-independence that could ground genuine normative authority.
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    • 3.Therefore, contingent moral commitments retain only the force of preference or convention, not the categorical 'ought' morality requires.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    A commitment arising from contingent causes (culture, upbringing, biology) provi...By analogy, moral commitments can be contingent yet retain compelling normative ...Constructivism's concession that moral commitments are contingent implicitly sur...Love is both contingent and compelling
    +4 moreShow less
    Mackie's error theory establishes that if moral facts do not exist mind-independ...Moral obligations, unlike love, make universalizable demands on all rational age...Normative force requires that a commitment's authority be grounded in something ...Therefore, contingent moral commitments retain only the force of preference or c...

    Similar

    By analogy, moral commitments can be contingent yet retain compelling ...87%The analogy between love and moral commitment does not establish that ...81%These commitments push toward moral realism rather than pure construct...80%Our normative commitments arise from how we must view ourselves as hav...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: constructivism-metaethics
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    The case for Humean constructivism rests on the alleged inadequacy of competing views: “it is what we are forced to by the untenability of realism plus the failure of Kantian versions of metaethical constructivism” (Street 2010: 371). Humean constructivism denies that normative truths are independent of the deliverances of practical reasoning (Bagnoli 2002: 131; Street 2008a, 2010, 2012; Velleman 2009; Lenman 2010, 2012). To this extent, Humean constructivism builds on the Kantian insight that n
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    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit