Mann's inference from 'x instantiates R' to 'x is a property instance' illicitly collapses the instantiation relation into identity, a move Frege's concept-object distinction explicitly prohibits.

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Frege(as a major historical figure in philosophy): Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was a German logician and philosopher who founded modern logic and did groundbreaking work on how language relates to meaning and existence.
Identity(Adams treats identity statements as a variety of atomic formula rather than a logical truth exempt from existence presuppositions): A relation between an object and itself, expressed as an atomic formula (a=a), subject to the same existence-entailment conditions as other atomic predicates under GSA
Mann(as the philosopher whose argument is being evaluated): A contemporary philosopher who has written about how properties (qualities or characteristics) exist and relate to objects; in this context, he's proposing a theory that the statement is critiquing.
Property instance(as used in metaphysics): A single occurrence of a property in a particular object—like the specific redness of one red apple, as opposed to the general idea of redness.

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