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    The move from (a) to (b) in Mann's argument is a non sequ... — Carmelics
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    The move from (a) to (b) in Mann's argument is a non sequitur absent some auxiliary premise.

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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Mann's inference from 'x instantiates R' to 'x is a property instance' illicitly collapses the instantiation relation into identity, a move Frege's concept-object distinction explicitly prohibits.
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    • 2.Without an auxiliary premise identifying the bearer of a property with the property instance itself, the inference commits the Bradley regress error of conflating relata with relations.
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    • 3.Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that the truth of 'x is F' requires a distinct ontological ground from x itself, confirming that instantiation never entails identity with what is instantiated.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aquinas's own doctrine of participation, which Mann invokes, distinguishes between a thing participating in a form and a thing being identical to that form—participation presupposes non-identity.
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    • 2.If participation entailed that the participant just is a property instance, then participated beings would be universals, contradicting the Thomistic framework Mann's argument is meant to support.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.For each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property R, and there are property instances such as the wisdom of Socrates.
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    • 2.From this it follows that for each x there is the rich property instance, the R-ness of x.
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    • 3.But everything instantiating properties (being an instance of properties) is not the same as everything being a property instance.
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    Related

    Aquinas's own doctrine of participation, which Mann invokes, distinguishes betwe...Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that the truth of 'x is F' requires a...But everything instantiating properties (being an instance of properties) is not...For each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property R, and the...
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    From this it follows that for each x there is the rich property instance, the R-...If participation entailed that the participant just is a property instance, then...Mann's inference from 'x instantiates R' to 'x is a property instance' illicitly...Socrates instantiates a rich property, and so is an instance of a property, but ...Without an auxiliary premise identifying the bearer of a property with the prope...

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    Aquinas's argument has the form: if P then Q; not P; therefore not Q73%The argument from God's lack of dimensionality fails to show that God ...71%Aristotle's argument from motion establishes only that there exists a ...70%God does not arrive at knowledge by deducing conclusions from premises...70%

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    SEP: divine-simplicity
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    Vallicella (2016, 379) argues that the move from (a) to (b) smacks of a non sequitur absent some auxiliary premise. Let it be granted arguendo that for each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property R. And let it be granted that there are property instances. So, in addition to Socrates and wisdom, there is the wisdom of Socrates. Recall that this property instance is not to be confused with the abstract state of affairs, Socrates’ being wise. From what has been granted it follows that for each x there is the rich property instance, the R-ness of x. But how is it supposed to...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit