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    Carmelics

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    Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red-experience ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Mary the super color scientist lacks understanding of what it is like to experience red despite her complete physical knowledge of color

    Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red-experience upon release, but this concept and the physical state it denotes are identical—no new non-physical property is instantiated.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Concepts and their referents can differ in cognitive mode while remaining numerically identical—like 'morning star' and 'evening star'.
      ?

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    • 2.Mary's new ability to recognize red-experiences is a conceptual/cognitive gain, not evidence of new properties in the physical world.
      ?

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    • 3.Physicalism requires only that all properties are ultimately physical, not that all concepts transparently reveal physical structures.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If Mary's pre-release and post-release concepts refer to the same physical state, they should have identical conceptual contents—but they clearly differ.
      ?

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    • 2.The subjective, first-person character of phenomenal concepts appears fundamentally distinct from objective physical-functional descriptions in kind.
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    • 3.Concept identity requires sameness of reference *and* conceptual content; Mary's new acquaintance-based concept differs in content from any physical description.
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    Key Terms

    Mary (the thought experiment)(as used in philosophy of mind)
    A famous imaginary scenario in philosophy where Mary is a scientist locked in a black-and-white room who knows all physical facts about color but has never seen color herself; philosophers use this to debate what happens when she finally sees red.
    Physical state(in philosophy of physics)
    The actual condition of something in the real world—for example, where an object is located and how fast it's moving.
    identical(whether the concept of 'human' and the concept of 'animal' are the same)
    Exactly the same as something else, not just similar but truly one and the same thing.
    instantiated(as used in metaphysics and logic)
    Made real or brought into existence as an actual example; like when a concept becomes a real thing you can observe.
    non-physical property(as used in philosophy of mind)
    A characteristic or quality that exists but cannot be measured, observed, or explained by physical science alone—something beyond the material world.
    phenomenal concept(May be discursive, demonstrative, or more direct.)
    A concept whose denotation is a phenomenal property.
    red-experience(as used in philosophy of consciousness)
    The subjective feeling or sensation of what it's like to see the color red, as opposed to just understanding the physics or biology behind color vision.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Concept identity requires sameness of reference *and* conceptual content; Mary's...Concepts and their referents can differ in cognitive mode while remaining numeri...If Mary's pre-release and post-release concepts refer to the same physical state...Mary the super color scientist lacks understanding of what it is like to experie...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    +3 moreShow less
    Mary's new ability to recognize red-experiences is a conceptual/cognitive gain, ...Physicalism requires only that all properties are ultimately physical, not that ...The subjective, first-person character of phenomenal concepts appears fundamenta...