Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red-experience upon release, but this concept and the physical state it denotes are identical—no new non-physical property is instantiated.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If Mary's pre-release and post-release concepts refer to the same physical state, they should have identical conceptual contents—but they clearly differ.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The subjective, first-person character of phenomenal concepts appears fundamentally distinct from objective physical-functional descriptions in kind.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Concept identity requires sameness of reference *and* conceptual content; Mary's new acquaintance-based concept differs in content from any physical description.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Concepts and their referents can differ in cognitive mode while remaining numerically identical—like 'morning star' and 'evening star'.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mary's new ability to recognize red-experiences is a conceptual/cognitive gain, not evidence of new properties in the physical world.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Physicalism requires only that all properties are ultimately physical, not that all concepts transparently reveal physical structures.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.