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    Mechanisms explain effects in terms of interlocking parts... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Challenges→Interlevel relationships should not be accepted as causal relations.

    Mechanisms explain effects in terms of interlocking parts at the same level.

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityCausation

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    Accepting interlevel relationships as causal violates many of the central ideas ...Causation can only be intra-level.Interlevel causation amounts to something causing itself, because different leve...Interlevel relationships should not be accepted as causal relations.
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    The relation across levels is one of constitution, not causation.

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    Influx theory can only explain causal relations between entities that ...71%Parsimony in causal explanation requires assigning the same causes to ...70%Causes and effects must be logically distinct from each other (Hume's ...69%If each component of a complex cause produces one component of a compl...69%

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    The debate here quickly gets into technical arguments about the concept of causation. Campbell argues against Frith in favour of the Humean idea that we simply cannot tell in advance of inquiry what causal relations obtain in nature. Anything can cause anything and it is just as unwarranted to suppose that the relevant explanatory variables for psychotic or affective phenomena must be cognitive as it is to adopt a simple reductionism and insist on their being biological. Decades of research have

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