Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Mental simulation events cannot be constitutive of mindre... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Mental simulation events cannot be constitutive of mindreading events.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mindreading requires the attribution of intentional mental states under mentalistic descriptions, not merely causal-functional mirroring (Davidson, 1963).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Simulation events, as offline reuses of first-person processes, produce states with the wrong causal-intentional structure to constitute propositional attitude attributions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A constitutive component of X must instantiate the same representational content-type as X; simulation outputs are egocentric, not other-directed attributions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Stich and Nichols (1992) demonstrate that successful mindreading requires a 'decision box' that explicitly tags simulated outputs as belonging to another agent.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.This tagging mechanism is a conceptual operation distinct from simulation itself, meaning simulation is at best a causal precursor, not a constitutive part, of mindreading.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If an explicit re-attribution step is necessary to transform simulation output into a third-person mental state ascription, then simulation and mindreading are distinct event-types.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.A mindreading event is, by definition, a mental event in which a subject S represents another subject Q as having a certain mental state M.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The only way S can represent Q as having mental state M is by employing the concept of that mental state and forming the judgment or belief that Q is in M.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, a mindreading event is identical to an event of judging that someone else has a certain mental state, entailing the application of mentalistic concepts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge2 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A constitutive component of X must instantiate the same representational content...A mindreading event is, by definition, a mental event in which a subject S repre...If an explicit re-attribution step is necessary to transform simulation output i...Mental simulation events are not events of judging that someone else has a certa...
    +7 moreShow less
    Mindreading requires the attribution of intentional mental states under mentalis...Simulation events, as offline reuses of first-person processes, produce states w...Stich and Nichols (1992) demonstrate that successful mindreading requires a 'dec...

    Similar

    Therefore, mental simulation events are not identical to mindreading e...96%Mental simulation events are not events of judging that someone else h...89%Lisa's mental simulation of disgust does not constitute a mindreading ...81%Therefore, a mindreading event is identical to an event of judging tha...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: folkpsych-simulation
    View source passageHide passage
    We shall elaborate on the details of the Constitution View in section 4.3. Before doing that, we consider an argument that has been directed against it over and over again, and which is supposed to show that the Constitution View is a non-starter (Fuller 1995; Heal 1995; Goldman 2008b; Jacob 2008, 2012). Lacking a better name, we will call it “the Anti-Constitution argument”. Here it is. By definition, a mindreading event is a mental event in which a subject, S, represents another subject, Q,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The only way S can represent Q as having mental state M is by employing the conc...
    Therefore, a mindreading event is identical to an event of judging that someone ...
    Therefore, mental simulation events are not identical to mindreading events and ...
    This tagging mechanism is a conceptual operation distinct from simulation itself...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit