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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Mental simulation events cannot be constitutive of mindreading events.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A mindreading event is, by definition, a mental event in which a subject S represents another subject Q as having a certain mental state M.
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    • 2.The only way S can represent Q as having mental state M is by employing the concept of that mental state and forming the judgment or belief that Q is in M.
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    • 3.Therefore, a mindreading event is identical to an event of judging that someone else has a certain mental state, entailing the application of mentalistic concepts.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Mindreading requires the attribution of intentional mental states under mentalistic descriptions, not merely causal-functional mirroring (Davidson, 1963).
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    • 2.Simulation events, as offline reuses of first-person processes, produce states with the wrong causal-intentional structure to constitute propositional attitude attributions.
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    • 3.A constitutive component of X must instantiate the same representational content-type as X; simulation outputs are egocentric, not other-directed attributions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Stich and Nichols (1992) demonstrate that successful mindreading requires a 'decision box' that explicitly tags simulated outputs as belonging to another agent.
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    • 2.This tagging mechanism is a conceptual operation distinct from simulation itself, meaning simulation is at best a causal precursor, not a constitutive part, of mindreading.
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    • 3.If an explicit re-attribution step is necessary to transform simulation output into a third-person mental state ascription, then simulation and mindreading are distinct event-types.
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