Methodological individualism does not prohibit relational individuation of mental states — it only requires that any individuating property, relational or otherwise, must affect causal powers.
Conditions consisting in forces that manifest themselves in people's bodily behavior, conceptually tied to corresponding types of bodily behavior but not reducible thereto
The view that social institutions and social change are to be explained by showing how they arise as the result of the actions and interactions of individuals
The issue comes down to one concerning the individuation of mental states. How do we determine what is and is not the “same” belief? Fodor begins by introducing the constraint that he calls “methodological individualism,” viz., “the doctrine that psychological states are individuated with respect to their causal powers” (1987, 42). This implies, among other things, that if one psychological state is incapable of causing anything different to happen than some other psychological state, then the t