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    Methodological solipsism precludes relational properties ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Methodological solipsism precludes relational properties from playing a role in the individuation of mental states.

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The semantic evaluation of a mental state is typically relational (e.g., whether beliefs about water are true depends on how things stand with water in the world).
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    • 2.Methodological solipsism individuates psychological states without respect to semantic evaluations.
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    • 3.Therefore, methodological solipsism excludes relational semantic properties from individuation.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Fodor's methodological solipsism targets computational individuation, not the exhaustive individuation of all mental state types.
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    • 2.Narrow content, as articulated by Fodor, is a legitimate individuating factor that captures functional role without precluding relational properties at a separate level of analysis.
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    • 3.A two-factor theory of content allows relational properties to individuate mental states at the wide-content level while preserving the narrow computational level intact.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Burge's twin-earth cases show that relational properties partly constitute mental state individuation, directly challenging the claim's assumed scope.
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    • 2.If anti-individualism is correct, then no principled methodological constraint can preclude relational properties from individuation without begging the question against externalism.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A two-factor theory of content allows relational properties to individuate menta...Burge's twin-earth cases show that relational properties partly constitute menta...Fodor's methodological solipsism targets computational individuation, not the ex...If anti-individualism is correct, then no principled methodological constraint c...
    +4 moreShow less
    Methodological solipsism individuates psychological states without respect to se...Narrow content, as articulated by Fodor, is a legitimate individuating factor th...The semantic evaluation of a mental state is typically relational (e.g., whether...Therefore, methodological solipsism excludes relational semantic properties from...

    Similar

    Methodological solipsism holds that psychological states are individua...90%Methodological solipsism individuates psychological states without res...90%Therefore, methodological solipsism excludes relational semantic prope...89%Methodological individualism does not prohibit relational individuatio...85%

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    SEP: methodological-individualism
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    The issue comes down to one concerning the individuation of mental states. How do we determine what is and is not the “same” belief? Fodor begins by introducing the constraint that he calls “methodological individualism,” viz., “the doctrine that psychological states are individuated with respect to their causal powers” (1987, 42). This implies, among other things, that if one psychological state is incapable of causing anything different to happen than some other psychological state, then the t
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    Details

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    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit