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    Moral realist traditions from Plato through Ross hold tha... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W is equal to the a priori probability that P has the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W.

    Moral realist traditions from Plato through Ross hold that certain first-order properties—such as being-an-instance-of-suffering—have their normative valence necessarily, not contingently.

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    Key Terms

    First-order properties(in ethics and metaphysics)
    The basic characteristics or qualities of things themselves—like 'causing suffering' or 'helping someone'—as opposed to properties about those properties.
    Necessarily
    "Necessarily" means something must be true in all possible situations—it's not just true right now, but couldn't be false under any circumstances. For example, "2+2=4 necessarily" means there's no possible way 2+2 could equal anything other than 4. This contrasts with "contingently" true facts, like "it's raining today," which happen to be true but could have been false.
    Normative valence(describes how the properties matter morally)
    The quality of being morally significant or carrying moral weight—whether something counts as good, bad, right, or wrong in a moral sense.
    Plato(the person whose decision to write is being analyzed in this example)
    An ancient Greek philosopher (around 428-348 BCE) who wrote famous dialogues exploring big questions about knowledge, justice, and reality.

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    Ross(as referenced in ethics)
    W.D. Ross, a 20th-century philosopher who argued that we have multiple moral duties (like honesty and keeping promises) that sometimes conflict, and we must figure out which is strongest in each situation.
    contingently(in modal logic)
    In a way that could be true or false; depending on specific circumstances rather than being required by logic or nature.
    moral realism(Used interchangeably here with moral objectivism)
    The view that moral facts are objective — that is, that moral claims can be true or false independently of what any individual or culture believes

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    Problem of Evil1 linked

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