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    Nagel's classical model requiring bridge laws was refuted... — Carmelics
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    Supports→There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing science to concepts or predicates of the reduced science for an explanation to count as a reduction.

    Nagel's classical model requiring bridge laws was refuted by Putnam's multiple realizability: mental states map onto heterogeneous physical substrates with no uniform conceptual bridge.

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    Key Terms

    Bridge laws(Philosophy of mind, type-identity theory)
    Strict biconditional laws of the form 'P1 ↔ M1' that correlate physical predicates with mental predicates, forming the basis of type-identity theories of mind.
    Heterogeneous(as used in the statement about diverse phenomena)
    Made up of many different kinds of things that don't all belong to the same category or type.
    Hilary Putnam(as a reference to a specific philosopher's arguments)
    An influential American philosopher (1926-2016) who made major contributions to philosophy of mind and language; he's famous for arguing that the same mental state could be realized in different physical ways.
    Physical substrates(in philosophy of mind)
    The actual material or physical stuff that underlies and supports a process—like how the brain is the physical substrate that supports thinking.

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    Thomas Nagel(as the philosopher being referenced)
    An influential American philosopher known for writing about consciousness, ethics, and how we understand ourselves. He published 'The Possibility of Altruism' in 1970 to explore whether we can be genuinely motivated to help others.
    mental states(Herder's theory of mind)
    Conditions consisting in forces that manifest themselves in people's bodily behavior, conceptually tied to corresponding types of bodily behavior but not reducible thereto
    multiple realizability(Philosophy of mind, functionalism)
    The property of functional kinds whereby the same functional role can be realized by different lower-level physical properties across systems or individuals

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

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    There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing ...

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