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    Necessarily false propositions are arguably not possible ... — Carmelics
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    Necessarily false propositions are arguably not possible objects of belief.

    Divine Attributes
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.We have a charitable tendency to re-interpret blatant contradictions in some innocuous way.
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    • 2.When our hermeneutical charity is thwarted, we suspend belief not in a proposition but in a putative proposition's being a proposition, or in a verbal formula's expressing a proposition.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frege and Russell documented cases where logically contradictory propositions were sincerely believed before their contradiction was discovered.
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    • 2.If necessarily false propositions were not believable, mathematical errors and paradoxes could never constitute genuine cognitive states.
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    • 3.The historical belief in naive set comprehension (pre-Russell) shows agents can hold contradictory beliefs without suspending propositional assent.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Priest's dialetheism holds that some contradictions are true, entailing that necessarily false propositions are coherent objects of rational belief.
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    • 2.If dialetheism is even a live philosophical option, the claim that necessarily false propositions are 'arguably' unbelievable loses its presumptive force.
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    Related

    Frege and Russell documented cases where logically contradictory propositions we...If dialetheism is even a live philosophical option, the claim that necessarily f...If necessarily false propositions were not believable, mathematical errors and p...Priest's dialetheism holds that some contradictions are true, entailing that nec...
    +3 moreShow less
    The historical belief in naive set comprehension (pre-Russell) shows agents can ...We have a charitable tendency to re-interpret blatant contradictions in some inn...When our hermeneutical charity is thwarted, we suspend belief not in a propositi...

    Similar

    Before one can affirm a proposition as true one must understand it, bu...83%It is logically impossible to know of a proposition that it is true or...81%For every false proposition there is a true one to the effect that the...81%A proposition that appears to be or entail a contradiction may not act...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: divine-simplicity
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    Third, if a proposition appears under careful scrutiny to be or entail a contradiction, then is there even a proposition before the mind? If you require for x’s salvation that x believe that God is one and God is three, what exactly are you demanding that x believe? Before x can affirm a proposition as true x must understand it, but how can x affirm as true a proposition that appears necessarily false? Such a ‘proposition’ is arguably not a proposition at all. God is simple but free appears to be in like case. As a matter of pure logic, there are of course necessarily false propositions: take ...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit