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Inverse View
It is not the case that Ned Block's and David Chalmers's work on narrow content shows that Twin Earth cases underdetermine whether phenomenal states lack intentionality altogether.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Twin Earth intuitions conflate metaphysical indeterminacy with epistemological underdetermination; the cases don't show indeterminacy itself.
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2.
Even narrow content theorists grant phenomenal states carry some representational content, so they don't lack intentionality altogether.
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3.
Block's own work on phenomenal consciousness emphasizes quale-properties that appear intrinsically intentional, undercutting the skeptical conclusion.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Twin Earth cases show internal physical states can be identical while external referents differ, supporting narrow content distinction.
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2.
Block and Chalmers demonstrate phenomenal character can supervene on internal states independently of intentional content aboutness.
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3.
If Twin Earth underdetermines intentionality, we cannot definitively conclude phenomenal states require intentional content.
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