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    Ned Block's and David Chalmers's work on narrow content s... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality or content

    Ned Block's and David Chalmers's work on narrow content shows that Twin Earth cases underdetermine whether phenomenal states lack intentionality altogether.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Twin Earth cases show internal physical states can be identical while external referents differ, supporting narrow content distinction.
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    • 2.Block and Chalmers demonstrate phenomenal character can supervene on internal states independently of intentional content aboutness.
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    • 3.If Twin Earth underdetermines intentionality, we cannot definitively conclude phenomenal states require intentional content.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Twin Earth intuitions conflate metaphysical indeterminacy with epistemological underdetermination; the cases don't show indeterminacy itself.
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    • 2.Even narrow content theorists grant phenomenal states carry some representational content, so they don't lack intentionality altogether.
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    • 3.Block's own work on phenomenal consciousness emphasizes quale-properties that appear intrinsically intentional, undercutting the skeptical conclusion.
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    Connections

    1 linked claim · 2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked
    Phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality or content

    Related

    Block and Chalmers demonstrate phenomenal character can supervene on internal st...Block's own work on phenomenal consciousness emphasizes quale-properties that ap...Even narrow content theorists grant phenomenal states carry some representationa...If Twin Earth underdetermines intentionality, we cannot definitively conclude ph...
    +3 moreShow less
    Phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality or contentTwin Earth cases show internal physical states can be identical while external r...Twin Earth intuitions conflate metaphysical indeterminacy with epistemological u...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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