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    No individual has an incentive to deviate from a traffic ... — Carmelics
    Home/Democracy & Governance
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    Supports→Once a city's traffic pattern settles on one of the two driving equilibria, it will tend to stay there

    No individual has an incentive to deviate from a traffic equilibrium once the community has coordinated on it

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract
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    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract

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    Moral Responsibility2 linked

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    Drivers who rush yellow lights in the slow-down equilibrium will risk collision ...Drivers who slow down on yellow lights while others rush them will get rear-ende...Once a city's traffic pattern settles on one of the two driving equilibria, it w...

    Similar

    Once a city's traffic pattern settles on one of the two driving equili...73%Class-level interests can diverge from individual member incentives wh...72%The two traffic equilibria are not Pareto-indifferent70%Unifying people while allowing for their differences is more effective...69%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: game-theory
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    Ross & LaCasse (1995) present the following example of a real-life coordination game in which the NE are not Pareto-indifferent, but the Pareto-inferior NE is more frequently observed. In a city, drivers must coordinate on one of two NE with respect to their behaviour at traffic lights. Either all must follow the strategy of rushing to try to race through lights that turn yellow (or amber) and pausing before proceeding when red lights shift to green, or all must follow the strategy of slowi

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